GALULA COUNTERINSURGENCY PDF
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice [David Galula, David Galula] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Back in print after almost. This monograph describes the nature and dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations citing David Galula’s theory. In his book. WARFARE. Theory and Practice. David Galula. Foreword by John A. Nagl. PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era. Praeger Security International. Westport.
|Published (Last):||8 May 2013|
|PDF File Size:||10.78 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||9.64 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
Aside from redefining a priori limitations to military engagements, Galula ingeniously prescribes new developmental principles, laws and theories for states to effectively combat an insurgency. Jan 14, Hadrian rated it really liked it Shelves: The final option, strengthening or building the “political machine” of the state, consists of convincing the population to buy into the state’s legitimacy and moral authority.
With an intellectual start point that “an insurgency is a competition between insurgent and government for the support of the population, which provides the sea in which the insurgent swims”, Counterimsurgency clinically describes the key features and strengths of insurgent and counterinsurgent forces and proposes clear principles for counterinsurgents. However, he cautions that the lessons of this book do not guarantee success and that, “As long as the revolutionary situation exists, even in a dormant form, as long as the problem that gave rise to the insurgency has not been eliminated, the danger persists” p The Counterinsurgeny States faces very different enemies today.
Counterinsurgency Warfare by David Galula – Praeger – ABC-CLIO
Destruction of the Insurgent Political Organization. Retrieved from ” https: Galula structured the book in such a way that a reader is first introduced to the “big picture” before being indoctrinated with the “devil in the details”. If he lies, cheats, exaggerates, and does not prove, he may achieve some temporary successes, but at the price of being discredited for good.
While he acknowledges the importance of conventional military tactics in counterinsurgency, he focuses primarily on ways to build an effective “political machine” capable of garnering the support of the people.
Written in the style of an army-guide, its insights are so basic to our modern understanding of counterinsurgency that it is difficult to see what the fuss is about. Read reviews that mention theory and practice counterinsurgency warfare warfare theory david galula field manual counterinsurgency middle east surge in iraq iraq and afghanistan read this book required reading psi classics military officer must read united states national security revolutionary warfare iraq war indochina and algeria cold war.
The Intractable Conflict Challenge Find out what you can do to help society more constructively handle the intractable conflicts that are making so many problems insoluble. See all 61 reviews. One topic I found interesting in this book was the clear definition and separation of conventional versus revolutionary conflicts and the statement that all revolutionary conflicts, and therefore insurgencies are political in nature.
Keeping this emphasis on political action and the laws of counterinsurgency in counteirnsurgency, Galula develops a comprehensive strategy for dealing effectively with hot insurgencies.
Caveat; clear is not necessarily simple, and even if it is simple, to quote Clausewitz “Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.
This book is, perhaps, the most definitive manual for an initiate in the subject of counterinsurgency. Those willing to actively support a counterinsurgency operation should be supported in their efforts to rally the relatively neutral majority and neutralize the hostile minority. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents. That is, the response necessary to eliminate the insurgency is likely to be seen as excessive by the general population.
Selected pages Title Page. The war is won or lost at the company level, where the leader is in direct and continuous contact with the population. This book provides an analysis of how to counterknsurgency insurgency and the elements that might hinder its defeat.
David Galula – Wikipedia
This volume in the Praeger Security International PSI series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era defines the laws of counrerinsurgency and outlines the strategy and tactics to combat such threats. But only for as long as he cannot be replaced, for it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians. The Orthodox Pattern Communist.
Reading it, so much of what Galula talks about seems so obvious now, but that only stands as evidence of how seminal a book it is in the field. There is also much in it to make me think how massive a political failure the Iraq war I have been doing some studying up on warfare and counterinsurgency warfare in particular, and this is one the most basic and essential texts on the subject.
Very interesting use of historical examples. Much of what I have to say are merely reflections of an amateur observer. There is also much in it to make me think how massive a political failure the Iraq war – and to a good extent, the war in Afghanistan as well – represents.
Specifically, his experience was in countering centralized, Mao-ist, internal insurgency. On the other hand, insurgents lack power, but they are much more free to violate both their promises and social norms.
There is plenty in it to make one wonder why the U. The counterinsurgent is tied to his responsibilities and to his past, and for him, facts speak louder than words. The first law is that the population is paramount.
The difficult task is galupa establish a well thought out doctrine that all levels of leadership must understand and fully embrace. They can act directly on the insurgent leaders, they can act indirectly on the conditions that are propitious to an insurgency, they can infiltrate the insurgent movement, or they can reinforce their own “Political Machine”.